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REQUIEM FOR HERCULES

SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY. By Ronald Dworkin. 1
Harvard University Press. 2000. $35.00.
Edward B. Pole/
In my home state of Ohio, as in many others, the highest
court in the state is struggling with how to specify the constitutional standard for an adequate system of public education. 3
This judicial task is rooted in the constitutional principle of
"equal protection": surely, this principle must embrace some
conception of equal, or at least adequate, educational opportunities for all children in the state. Yet defining a constitutionally
appropriate standard of educational opportunity turns out to be
a very tricky task. 4
One might have thought that a newly published book on
"the theory and practice of equality" would offer some assistance on this currently vexing question about the appropriate
constitutional standard of educational opportunity. But Ronald
Dworkin's new book makes no such effort. Its failure to do so is
emblematic of the gap between what is promised by its title and
what is actually delivered in its pages.
I do not wish to be harsh in this review, and I certainly have
no illusions that this particular critique of one book will (or
should) damage Dworkin's justly deserved reputation in general
for being a leading figure (perhaps the leading figure) in AngloI. Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law, New York University, and Quain Professor of Jurisprudence, University College of London.
2. Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University. As will
become apparent, this review draws upon my experience during the last two years as
State Solicitor of Ohio, although the views expressed herein are solely my own.
3. See DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St.3d 628, 758 (2001); DeRolph v. State, 89 Ohio
St.3d 1, 728 N.E.2d 993 (2000); DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733
(1997). The issue is back before the Ohio Supreme Court for yet a fourth time.
4. My own effort to address this topic is Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited:
Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 475 (1998).
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American jurisprudence in the second half of the twentieth century. But Dworkin's stature and well-recognized brilliance, as
well as his own professed ambition to provide us with a systematic and useful account of equality as a political principle, carry
the consequence that, insofar as he falls short, he falls from a
much greater height.
I. EQUALITY AND INHERITED WEALTH
Dworkin's project is to give us a theory of political equality
that, upon analysis and reflection, we will find morally compelling (i.e., we feel obligated to subscribe to it as long as we are
willing to take seriously our basic moral commitment to other
persons as fellow human beings). Dworkin also wants his theory
to be useful in the specific sense that it will entail, or at least
strongly suggest, outcomes to specific and concrete questions of
justice that confront society (such as how much health insurance
should government provide to each citizen). But Dworkin's inability to address the issue of educational opportunity means
that his project is neither philosophically persuasive nor practically useful.
I make this point about educational opportunity because, as
shall become apparent in the course of this critique, having a
point of view concerning the relative educational opportunities
of children born at the same time within a society is an essential
element to providing a theory of justice applicable over time,
from one generation to the next. Moreover, since Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Rush addressed this issue during the
Founding generation, our Nation has been intensely concerned
with the moral question of educational fairness for all the Nation's youth. Consequently, a theory of justice that purports to
be comprehensive- but has no answer for how to allocate educational opportunity fairly among all our Nation's childreninevitably will lack currency for policymakers who need to make
actual decisions on this pressing topic.
The basic idea of social insurance. Dworkin's basic strategy
is to hypothesize a desert island and to imagine how a group of
individuals stranded there would divvy up the island's resources
if they were committed to securing political equality among
themselves. In this respect, Dworkin's project is similar to previous works of political and legal philosophy. 5 Not surprisingly,
5.

See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press,
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Dworkin believes that the island's natural resources should be
shared equally among all its new inhabitants, and he devises an
auction in which equal lots may be parceled out.
Dworkin's theory of equality does not stop with this division
of natural resources. Reasonably enough, he recognizes that differences among individuals in their own natural talents may
make a strictly equal distribution of natural resources unfair.
Individuals born with severe genetic defects may need more
natural resources than other individuals just to maintain the
same standard of living. Consequently, Dworkin devises an insurance mechanism to rectify this situation.
Dworkin devotes much of his attention to the details of his
hypothetical auction and insurance schemes. These theoretical
details may be of interest to the inhabitants of philosophy departments engaged in the purest forms of political theory, but I
doubt they will be of much interest to lawyers and judges, or
even law professors, who seek insights from political philosophy
in order to resolve particular legal disputes. Even if we agree
with Dworkin on all of these details, there remains a much more
fundamental problem: securing a fair system of insurance for all
the initial inhabitants of a desert island does not tell us what
would be fair for successive generations of inhabitants on the island.
What, in principle, is the right amount of "inheritance insurance"? It might be an exaggeration to say that the only interesting question of justice is how to achieve a fair allocation of resources among each new generation of children born into the
world. But surely it is a crucial question, since all nation-states
are intended to survive from each generation to the next.
Dworkin, however, seems peculiarly uninterested in the problem
of justice, over time, among successive generations of a society.
Dworkin devotes only a few short pages to the subject (pp.
346-49), and all he says there is that his insurance idea can be
employed to conceptualize the amount of insurance a child
would want to purchase to guard against the risk of lazy or ungenerous parents (who are unable or unwilling to bequeath relatively large amounts of wealth to their children). 6 The difficulty
1980) which, in a more science fiction version of the same scenario, imagined a group of
humans settling a deserted planet.
6. Since children, especially those not yet born, cannot purchase insurance for
themselves, Dworkin hypothesizes the existence of guardians who purchase insurance on
t~eir behal!. These guardians are essentially the same as those in Rawls's original position, especially on Rawls's most recent interpretation of this idea. See John Rawls, Jus-
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with this idea is that Dworkin is unable to identify, even in principle, how much "inheritance insurance" any individual would
(or should) want to purchase. This difficulty, moreover, seems
inherently insurmountable, because each individual must balance two conflicting interests corresponding to two distinct
points in the person's life. First, an individual has an interest as
a child and young adult in receiving an ample bequest from his
or her parents, and indeed the very concept of inheritance insurance is to protect this interest. Second, however, the same individual at a latter stage in his or her life also has an interest in being able to transmit an ample bequest to his or her own children.
The tax on bequests that would pay for inheritance insurance
would impair this second interest.
The question then is at what level to set this tax, in order to
balance an individual's interests in both obtaining inheritance insurance and passing wealth to one's own children. I know of no
philosophical basis for answering this question, and Dworkin
gives us none. The matter seems one that is susceptible to personal preference. One individual could have a strong preference
for a larger bequest as a child (resulting in a diminished capacity
to benefit his or her own child), while another could have a
strong preference in the opposite direction (a willingness to receive less as a child in order to pass on more to one's own children). All Dworkin can say is that many individuals might want
to adopt a high marginal rate for the tax on bequests, reflecting a
willingness to forego a very large bequest to their own children
in order to protect against the chance that they might be very
much poorer as a child than their own contemporaries (p. 349).
The imprecision of Dworkin's answer to this question is unsettling. To be sure, we cannot expect political philosophy to tell
us that the marginal rate for inheritance taxes should be 70 instead of 65 percent. That kind of line-drawing depends too
much on empirical facts about local conditions (the circumstances of a particular society here and now). But we have come
to expect that, at least in principle, political philosophy should be
able to tell us what value a fair rate of taxation is designed to
achieve.
For example, perhaps the tax rate should be set to maximize
the amount of revenue the IRS is able to collect from the tax, in
order to have the most money available for paying out benefits
tice as Fairness: A Restatement 84 (Belknap Press, 2001): "The parties [in the original position], as representatives of free and equal citizens, act as trustees or guardians."
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under the inheritance insurance policy. Alternatively, perhaps
the tax rate should be set to maximize the total wealth of society,
so that in the aggregate there is the most available to pass from
generation to generation. 7 The goal of political philosophy historically has been to identify some such value, or principle, as
the right one for the tax system to pursue, leaving to technical
experts the task of determining the rate, 65 or 70 percent (or
whatever), most likely to correspond to the value identified by
political philosophy.
In this light, Dworkin's answer-that inheritance taxes
should be set high enough that no one child receives an inheritance making him or her "very much richer" than his or her contemporaries (p.349)-is unsatisfying in principle. How much
richer is "very much"? And, indeed, what is wrong with a tax
system that permits affluent parents to make their own children
"very much richer" than the children of less affluent (or less
generous) parents, so long as all inhabitants of society are guaranteed an annual income that provides a decent standard of living, as Dworkin himself stipulates before considering the issue of
unequal inheritances? His hypothetical idea of purchasing inheritance insurance cannot answer these questions, since deciding not to buy any such insurance at all (especially when one already is guaranteed an adequate annual income) cannot be ruled
out as unreasonable.
To see the problem more clearly, let us imagine a congress
of fiduciaries gathered together to determine the appropriate
level of inheritance insurance for each child born in a given year.
Assume one fiduciary is assigned to each child, and each fiduciary is properly motivated to act in the best interests of that child,
as best as the fiduciary can determine it. We need to assume
also that each fiduciary is ignorant of the particular socioeconomic circumstances into which each child is born, since paying taxes for inheritance insurance is of no interest to the child
lucky enough to be born into a family with super-rich parents
motivated to bequeath their vast fortune to their children, and
the whole of point of this congress is to off-set the "brute luck"
of having parents with their particular level of wealth and personal motivations.
This congress of fiduciaries is beginning to look a lot like
7. These two strategies are likely to be different, since maximizing IRS tax revenues would tend to create economic disincentives that would prevent maximizing the
total wealth of society.
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Rawls's "original position," with its attendant difficulties. How
should the fiduciaries decide what is the right level of inheritance
insurance for all of their children? Suppose one fiduciary announces to the congress, "Let's abandon this idea of inheritance
insurance. We've already guaranteed each child other forms of
social insurance throughout their lifetimes, including a minimum
wage, a minimum pension, and a minimum level of health insurance. I don't think there is any need to guarantee a minimum
level of inheritance as well. On the contrary, I think there is a
better than fifty-fifty chance that the child for whom I am exercising fiduciary responsibility will grow up to be a parent who
will want no taxes imposed on wealth bequeathed to his or her
own children."
Should the other fiduciaries be convinced by this argument?
Alternatively, is there any counter-argument that these other fiduciaries ought to provide that should convince this fiduciary to
change viewpoints on this issue? Perhaps we cannot expect that
even hypothetical fiduciaries, behind a veil of ignorance, would
be able to convince each other to settle unanimously on a social
contract containing a principle for determining the right level of
inheritance insurance. Perhaps then we should let the congress
of fiduciaries settle the issue by majority vote.
But how should a conscientious fiduciary go about deciding
for himself or herself what, in principle, is the right level of social
insurance to vote for? There are obviously lots of different options to choose from. It doesn't seem right that the fiduciary
would choose the option most in accord with his or her own personal tastes: that's not exercising the role of the fiduciary. But
Dworkin has nothing else to offer: there is no standard for determining what principle of inheritance insurance this congress
of fiduciaries should adopt. And so there is no way to criticize
any congress- hypothetical or real-for failing to adopt a sufficient level of inheritance insurance.
The promise of political philosophy was that it would offer
thoughtful citizens a basis for claiming that policies adopted by
the existing government in society were unjust and should be
changed. Dworkin accepted the challenge of living up to that
promise. Regrettably, like Rawls and others both before and
since, Dworkin ultimately cannot deliver as promised.
II. SCHOOL FUNDING
Dworkin's inability to answer the inheritance issue points to
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the problem he would have if he were to address the question of
school funding that currently vexes so many state supreme
courts. Following Dworkin's own strategy regarding the issue of
inheritance, one might attempt to extrapolate Dworkin's insurance idea to the issue of statewide support for local public education. In other words, one could conceive of the financial support that a state provides less affluent local school districts as a
kind of insurance policy that individuals might buy to guard
against the possibility that they, or their children, might live in a
less affluent district.
One problem with this approach, however, is the same
problem we saw with the application of the insurance idea to the
issue of inheritance: it was impossible to specify, even in principle, the right level of insurance that an individual should buy.
An individual's interest in bequeathing wealth to his or her own
children undercut the same individual's interest in taxing bequests in order to sustain a high level of inheritance insurance,
and Dworkin can offer no principle for reconciling this conflict
of interests. The identical point applies here: an individual's interest in a high level of "school funding insurance" conflicts with
the same individual's interest in sending his or her own children
to school in a more affluent district. (If the more affluent district
is taxed to pay for the "school funding insurance," as would be
analogous to the tax on bequests to pay for "inheritance insurance," then the interest in a low level of taxation inevitably conflicts with the interest in a high level of insurance, and there is no
principle for identifying an appropriately fair level of taxation.) 8
But there is an even more fundamental problem with applying the insurance idea to the school funding issue. Ordinarily,
we think of insurance as a kind of "safety net," and indeed
Dworkin himself thinks of insurance in this way. His goal with
respect to income insurance and health insurance is to identify,
at least in principle, the amount of insurance that individuals
would buy if they were purchasing this insurance in a condition

8. Recall, here, that an individual's relative interests in both receiving "social
funding insurance" and being free from the obligation to pay for this insurance is to be
determined, ex ante, by a guardian who does not know the chances that the individual
will actually need this insurance for his or her own education or, later in life, for his or
her children's education. Thus, even though for some people living today it would be
easy to tell whether they would benefit more from higher or lower levels of this "school
funding insurance," in the hypothetical situation where we are trying to identify what is
the "right" level of insurance to buy for all persons, it is impossible to make this determination.
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of equality. This approach, then, would tell us where to set the
safety net.
It is incongruous to think of education as a kind of safety
net. On the contrary, education is an essential ingredient that
molds a child into adult, which occurs before an adult enters the
social world to which the idea of a safety net subsequently is applied. To put this point colloquially, education is something that
gets an individual to the starting line, in order to run the race of
life. A safety net, like a crutch or a stretcher, is something you
give to an individual who trips and falls during the race.
For this reason, we tend to think that a fair system of public
education must be rooted in a concept of equal opportunity that
is a stronger principle than, and has a priority over, the operation of a social safety net. This thought is captured in the notion
that, first and foremost, we must give a child an adequate education, and after we have satisfied this condition we can talk about
what kind of welfare programs should be available after this
child grows up to be an adult. It is not surprising, then, that Republicans tend to support more generous grants for improving
public education than they do for guaranteeing each adult a
minimal level of income and health insurance.
Thus, one might have wished that Dworkin's systematic
study of the "theory and practice of equality" would have addressed this distinct concept of equal opportunity and how it fits
into an overall regime that shows equal concern for each of its
citizens. But Dworkin does not do so. 9 Since he largely ignores
the problems of achieving justice among children as a consequence of their membership in families, concentrating instead on
how to achieve justice among adults who are hypothesized to
start a new society in a position of initial equality, Dworkin
never confronts the fundamental question of what constitutes
fair educational opportunities for all children in light of the fact
that different families have different resources with which to
educate their own children.
Not that Dworkin would have had much success if he had
tackled the concept of fair educational opportunities. John
Rawls, the great philosopher whom Dworkin (like so many others) attempts to emulate, has wrestled with this idea for over
9. He does, in responding to one critic of his earlier work on equality, use the term
"equality of opportunity" (see p. 289-90), but he does so to refer to an abstract concept
much different from the idea of giving each citizen an equal education, so that economic
competition among adults will be fair.
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thirty years and recently confessed to having gotten nowhere. In
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls attempts to encapsulate
the essence of his earlier work, A Theory of Justice, while at the
same time modifying some points in response to his critics. As in
A Theory of Justice itself, in his Restatement Rawls gives the idea
of a "fair equal of opportunity" a prominent position: although
subordinate to a system of equal liberties, it has supremacy over
his principle for redistributing wealth from those more fortunate
to others less so. (In this regard, Rawls's ordering of his principles of justice tracks our own intuitions about the priority of
equal educational opportunities over securing a social safety net
for income and health insurance.)
But Rawls now acknowledges that, essentially, he has no
idea what this idea of "fair equality of opportunity" really means
or how to identify what it might entail. In a footnote, he writes:
"Some think that [a strict] priority of fair equality of opportunity
over the difference principle is too strong, and that either a
weaker priority or a weaker form of the opportunity principle
would be better . . . . At present I do not know what is best here
and simply register my uncertainty. How to specify and weight
the opportunity principle is a matter of great difficulty and some
such alternative may well be better. " 10 We must applaud Rawls's
candor about this impasse, because surely it must be frustrating
to have such a crucial component of one's theory so unsettled.
Dworkin, by contrast, does not seem to realize just what
desperate straits he is in. He wants his own ideal regime to depend entirely upon a distinction between "choice and chance"
(p. 287): an individual's economic fate should depend upon his
or her own choices in life, but not upon that individual's bad
luck. This idea is certainly a sympathetic one, but Dworkin apparently does not realize that ultimately it is unsustainable because of the role of families in a person's life.
When discussing his idea of inheritance insurance, Dworkin
says: "Luck, for purposes of our analysis, includes what might be
thought to be matters of identity as well as accidents that happen
once identity is fixed, and the situation and properties of one's
parents or relatives are as much a matter of luck, in that sense, as
one's own physical powers" (p. 347). Because no child should be
saddled with the misfortunate of poor parenting, Dworkin devises his idea of inheritance insurance. But parents bequeath to
their children much more than just their material wealth. The
10.

Rawls, Restatement at 163 n.44 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
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resources that some parents provide their own children include
the distinctive form of education that occurs at the family dinner
table, and in some families this education is much more enlightening than others. The only way to achieve Dworkin's ideal goal
of "equality of resources" would be to eliminate the family as a
social institution and to adopt, instead, Plato's idea of socialized
nurseries. And this, of course, we are not about to do.
The reason we reject socialized nurseries, moreover, reveals
the fundamental flaw of Dworkin's project. We reject them because we insist on having the choice of influencing the upbringing of our own offspring. Yet it is this fundamental choice that
causes differential luck to the members of future generations.
Protecting this fundamental choice means that, in truth, we do
not want a person's economic situation to be insensitive to relative misfortunate. On the contrary, we want the totality of resources, educational and otherwise, that each child obtains during childhood to depend (at least in part) on what that child
receives from the family into which that child is born. Ultimately, then, the choice/luck distinction cannot capture what we
want a theory of justice to provide. 11
Our desire to permit parents to influence the education of
their own children is so fundamental that we have protected it as
an essential element of our constitutional law, even though this
parental liberty is nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitution itself. Again, one would have thought that Dworkin's
background and interest in constitutional law would have led
him to discuss Pierce v. Society of Sisters 12 and the relationship of
this constitutional liberty with the problem of equalizing educational opportunity. But Dworkin has nothing for us on this most
basic point, and because of critical omission his attempt to develop a systematic theory of equality must be judged a failure.

II. In a chapter on the moral implications of genetic engineering, Dworkin recognizes that his choice/chance distinction becomes radically undermined if parents get to
choose the genetic identity of their children (p. 444-46). But, to a great extent, parents
choose-or at least significantly shape-the identity of their children through formal and
informal education. The power of a parent to make a child smarter by reading to that
children from birth to age three-years-old seems no different, in this respect, from the
power of a parent to make a child smarter by selecting an intelligence gene from a menu
provided by a genetic engineer. Indeed, Dworkin himself makes a similar point in another context (p. 443). Thus, the brave new world of parental power is already upon us
and, in fact, has been with us for thousands of years. A parent's power over a child's
education collapses the choice/chance distinction, just as does the genetic engineering
that Dworkin fears.
12. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE
If philosophers like Dworkin and Rawls cannot give us a
meaningful principle of justice-one which would tell us, among
other things, how much funding to reallocate from affluent
school districts to less affluent ones-what then are we to do?
The answer should be apparent to anyone familiar with
John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust: 13 whenever political
philosophy is unable to settle upon a substantive solution to a
problem of justice, turn instead to a procedural solution. In
other words, let's improve our processes for making democratically such tax-and-spending decisions as those involved in the
school funding debates.
To his credit, Dworkin devotes considerable attention in his
book to one important defect in our current political processes:
the substantial advantage of affluent citizens to broadcast their
preferred political messages under our current campaign finance
laws. Moreover, Dworkin's discussion of this issue offers an important theoretical contribution, one that might eventually prove
useful in actual litigation concerning the constitutionality of
campaign finance reforms. In this sense, then, Dworkin's discussion of campaign finance provides a practical payoff, promised
but missing from elsewhere in his book.
Dworkin's theoretical insight is to observe that citizens of
democracy are not merely consumers of public discussion of political issues but also participants in that discussion themselves.
As equals in their citizenship, citizens should be able to engage
in this participation on equal terms (or at least roughly so). This
right of equal participation provides a reason to restrain rich citizens from using their personal wealth to increase their own ability to participate relative to poor citizens, even if as consumers of
political discourse citizens have no reason to limit the participation of the rich (p. 358).
Also to Dworkin's credit, he attempts to show how his theoretical insight about equal participation might be used by advocates seeking to overrule that portion of Buckley v. Valeo 14
which invalidated legislative limits on campaign spending. For
all his time spent on pure political philosophy, Dworkin is still a
brilliant lawyer, and his discussion of relevant First Amendment

13. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard
U. Press, 1980).
14. 425 U.S. 96 (1976).
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caselaw is dazzling. The dexterity with which Dworkin lines up
particular precedents in support of the principle of equal participation, including a different portion of Buckley itself, is a formidable piece of advocacy, the benefits of which I would want to
incorporate were I attempting to defend a new expenditure limit
back in the Supreme Court (pp. 373-80).
Even so, I remain uneasy about how Dworkin structures his
argument for overruling Buckley. Based on my own experience
as State Solicitor of Ohio during the last couple of years, there is
still a large gap between Dworkin's approach and how one
would argue the issue in the Supreme Court. First of all,
Dworkin's analysis of the relevant caselaw- however brilliant it
is-does not give the precedential force of Buckley its due. The
Court would not line up a set of precedents favoring equal participation on one side, with Buckley on the other, as Dworkin
himself does, to see whether this principle of equal participation
is a better "fit" with the Court's caselaw as a whole. Instead, the
Court would start with Buckley itself as directly on-point authority for the proposition that spending limits are unconstitutional,
and then ask whether there is sufficient reason to overrule that
specific determination. I am not at all sure that, standing alone,
theoretical inconsistency between that holding and other First
Amendment decisions would suffice to dislodge the precedent.
Instead, I would want to take to the Court some compelling
factual proposition about Buckley being untenable in light of the
evidence since 1976 about how campaigns are actually financed
by real-world politicians. This is why Vincent Blasi's point about
the inability of politicians to devote their time and attention to
policy because of incessant fundraising-a point that is powerful
in part because it lacks pretense of theoretical grandeur-is
more likely to persuade the Court than Dworkin's offer of a new
theoretical insight about the nature of democracy. 15
And even if I were to include in a brief to the Court a point
about this idea of equal participation, I would not want to be so
imperious as to claim that this idea emanates from a superior
conception of democracy than the consumer-of-politicalinformation perspective underlying Buckley itself. Rather, I
15. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fundraising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 1281 (1994). In fact, the Supreme Court recently cited Blasi's article as possible
basis for revisiting the Buckley holding on expenditure limits in some future case. Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533
U.S. 431,442 n.8 (June 25, 2001).
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would want to observe only that reasonable people can differ
about which conception of democracy is superior, and because
neither the text nor history of the First Amendment presupposes
one over the other, democratic processes themselves should be
free to select which conception of democracy they wish to
adopt. 16 Dworkin would do well to include within his own argument a more modest approach of this kind, which appeals to
the distinctive institutional role of the Court in constitutional
cases and the appropriate degree of deference owed to legislatures (state and federal) when the Constitution itself is indeterminate and citizens reasonably may disagree about the underlying philosophical or policy judgments necessary to settle the
constitutional question. But Dworkin's argument for overruling
Buckley is infected by his earlier work on constitutional interpretation, which presupposes the possibility of "right answers"
rooted in philosophical truth. 17
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A related point can be made about Dworkin's discussion of
affirmative action. He devotes two chapters to this topic, and
together they bolster the point that persuasive arguments on
contestable questions of constitutional law are more likely to derive from new facts rather than new theory. Indeed, Dworkin's
first chapter on affirmative action is devoted to the new empirical evidence generated by the monumental study undertaken by
William Bowen and Derek Bok and published in their book The
Shape of the River. The power of their statistical findings is, as
Dworkin seems to realize himself, much stronger than the doctrinal or theoretical points he adds to this statistical evidence.
Let's cut to the chase: although Dworkin still drags his feet a
bit on accepting "strict scrutiny" in affirmative action cases, we
all know winning these cases requires convincing a majority of
the Court that racial diversity among university students is an interest "compelling" enough to justify considering an applicant's
race as an admissions factor. Persuading the Court on this point
is unlikely to stem from any new theoretical proposition but instead from new evidence about how racial diversity in classrooms, and on campuses more generally, actually contributes to
16. I have explored this point at greater length in Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the
Constitution, and Campaign Finance, 10 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 23 (1998).
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1996).
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the learning process of all students.
Moreover, as the litigators in the trenches know well, winning the argument that diversity is, indeed, a "compelling" interest is only half the battle. They still need to show that racesensitive admissions are "necessary" to secure this interest, and
the counterargument inevitably will be that they are unnecessary
because university can achieve racial diversity using the kind of
"top five or ten percent" admissions programs adopted in Texas
and elsewhere. To be sure, these alternatives do damage other
goals a university's admissions policy might wish to pursue. For
example, they lower the overall standardized test scores of an
entering class. But then the question becomes whether the desire to attain a higher level of these scores justifies the consideration of race as part of the admissions process. Dworkin adds little insight on this important issue.
Insofar as Dworkin devotes his attention to the ends, rather
than the means, of affirmative action, he is right to wish that the
defense of these admissions programs rested upon a second justification, in addition to diversity (p. 423). But using theoretically
"top-down" (rather than empirically "bottom-up") methodology, as Dworkin generally does, may have caused him to miss
what strikes me as the most promising new approach of this
kind. In footnote 43 of his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell recognized that it might be necessary for a university to consider
race in its admissions process in order to correct for a racially
disparate impact in its other admissions criteria. 18 The university
in Bakke did not attempt to make that argument, but evidence
now exists that would enable universities to do so in the future.
The most important new evidence on this point comes from
a study of graduates from the University of Michigan Law
School. 19 This evidence, covering three decades, shows that minority graduates are just as successful in the practice of law as
white graduates, even though they entered law school with inferior LSATs. This evidence then tell us, as Justice Powell suggested, that it is necessary to supplement a law school's use of
LSATs as an admissions criterion with a consideration of an applicant's race, so that LSAT scores do not cause minorities to be
underrepresented in law school admissions relative to their ca18.
ell, J.).
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19. Richard 0. Lempert, et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The
River Runs Through Law School, 25 1. L. & Soc. Inq. 395 (2000).
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pacity to for equal success in the practice of law.
Perhaps it is wrong to criticize Dworkin for failing to develop this evidence-dependent alternative defense of affirmative
action. One cannot expect a philosopher to be aware of all the
empirical data bubbling up from the routine operations of the
legal profession. But this fact inevitably leads me to the conclusion that, on the whole, the academic study of law would be better served by spending proportionally more of its time observing
ordinary legal events and less time theorizing about abstract legal concepts.
In fairness to Dworkin, this is not a conclusion I would have
come to, in all likelihood, except for my recent experience immersed in actual litigation myself: even though virtually all of my
caseload as State Solicitor concerned constitutional questions in
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, I had little occasion to turn to the kind of scholarship undertaken by Dworkin
and others-including myself in my previous academic work. At
the same time, however, I often found myself looking for scholarship that would help me think through a task I confronted in a
particular pending case. For example, one challenge as an advocate is to be effective rhetorically about precedent that "cuts the
other way," yet I found surprisingly little (beyond basic legal
writing texts) to help in this rhetorical enterprise. Perhaps I was
looking in the wrong places, but it is also perhaps a reflection on
"legal academia," as it has developed over the last couple of
decades, that a professor of constitutional law with ten years experience would not have "at his fingertips" a handful of sources
about the art of presenting an effective argument in a tricky constitutional case. Instead, this professor could instantly cite five
(or even ten) sources about how leading academics would rule if
they were privileged to be sitting on the bench.
Not that there is no place for the kind of theoretical or normative scholarship that has become so fashionable among professors of constitutional law in recent years. Only that the balance of scholarly attention has shifted too far in one direction
and should shift back towards the center. We are all a product
of the culture in which we reside, and the culture of legal academia, at least within the field of constitutional law, has been
dominated for some time by a belief that a systematic theory-of
the kind pursued by Dworkin-is the profession's holy grail.
The results of Dworkin's project, however, suggest that it is
time to scale back our ambitions.
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CONCLUSION:
REORIENTING CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP
The upshot is that Dworkin's enterprise has run its course.
For the last thirty years, since Rawls published A Theory of Justice, Dworkin and others have endeavored to apply political philosophy to the exercise of constitutional interpretation. The
thought was that an ideal judge-Dworkin called him Hercules-would be able to discover philosophical truth, in a Rawlsian
spirit, and incorporate that truth in constitutional interpretation.
In Dworkin's own words from 1972, he explicitly "argue[ d] for a
fusion of constitutional law and moral theory," invoking Rawls's
Theory of Justice as a work that "no constitutional lawyer will be
able to ignore. "20
Three decades later, however, Rawls himself now acknowledges that he does not have the answers after all. And insofar as
Sovereign Virtue represents Dworkin's best attempt to develop a
philosophical theory of equality that could underlie the interpretation of the "equal protection" clause, we have seen that
Dworkin's effort fares no better than Rawls's. The answers just
aren't there.
This realization means we need a different approach to constitutional scholarship than the mission Dworkin and his followers have set out on for the last three decades. It is time to bury
Hercules, although I say this not without regret. I, too, had
hoped that the Herculean question for right answers to constitutional questions would prove successful, at least in principle. But
wishing it will not make it so.
I do not go so far to say that we should altogether abandon
normative scholarship within the field of constitutional law. I
just doubt that it can be of the Herculean kind. Instead, we
should aim for more modest, incrementalist points that tend to
be evidentiary, rather than theoretical, in nature. This last
comment might seem unduly influenced by the kind of Supreme
Court we currently have, which (as we all know) is dominated in
the center by moderate, incrementalist jurists. But I think the
point goes deeper than the current composition of the Court.
Rather, I think it reflects the fact that we cannot expect answers
on Big Questions, and so necessarily must search for answers to
smaller ones.

20.

Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 149 (Harvard U. Press, 1977).

